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UNWANTED PUBLICITY, THE NEWS MEDIA, AND
THE CONSTITUTION: WHERE PRIVACY RIGHTS
COMPETE WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ERNEST D. GIGLIO*
A SSUME YOU ARE WAITING in a crowd to view the President of the United
States as he leaves his downtown hotel. As the President, naturally
surrounded by Secret Service agents, approaches the limousine, a person near
you raises a pistol and aims it at the President. Instinctively, you grab the
raised arm, thereby thwarting the assassination attempt. By your deed, you
have become a national hero and the news media wants to know all about
you because you are what is known in the communications industry as "hot
news." But in their pursuit of the news story, the media learns that you are a
member of San Francisco's gay community, a fact known only to that group.
When the print and broadcast media publish the fact of your homosexual
preference, your family in Ohio disowns you.
The above situation approximates that of ex-Marine Oliver Sipple,1
who in 1975 foiled an assassination attempt on the life of President Ford
by Sara Jane Moore as he was leaving a San Francisco hotel. The Sipple
case graphically illustrates the current and growing tension between one
aspect of privacy - the right to be free from unwanted publicity of private
facts about yourself - and the formidable freedom accorded speech and
press under the first amendment. For his act of heroism, Oliver Sipple paid
a high price. Not only did he lose the love and respect of his family, but he
had lost control over a piece of information about himself which he preferred
to share with some, rather than with everyone. He had been a private person
*Associate Professor of Political Science, Lycoming College; Ph.D., Maxwell Graduate
School of Syracuse University; 1978 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer
Fellow at the University of Georgia.
'Abrams, The Press, Privacy and the Constitution, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1977, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 11-13, 65, 68-71. The author claims that Sipple has filed invasion of privacy suits
against several West Coast newspapers. Id. at 11. However, a search of the California Re-
ports failed to confirm this assertion. Two explanations are possible: (1) the case has been
settled out of court or (2) the case has not been disposed of yet. Sipple's chances of winning
such a suit appear dim on the basis of another California case where Michael S. Virgil, a
well-known body surfer, sued Time, Inc. for violating his right to privacy by publishing an
article in SPORTs ILLUSTRATED that contained facts of an unflattering and embarrassing nature
about his private life and were not matters of public interest. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527
F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). Only Justices Brennan and
Stewart would have granted certiorari.
[229]
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unknown to the rest of us until his good deed thrust him into the national
arena and made him a public figure.!
I. DEFAMATION AND THE PRIVACY TORT
The Sipple case raises some questions again about the present relation-
ship between the increasing concern for privacy and our strong commitment
to freedom of speech and press. Before we venture into the judicial quagmire,
we should pause to refresh our memories. Privacy is the stepchild of defa-
mation. Defamation, including seditious libel, is at least 300 years old and
was well known to the colonists who settled America. The concept was fa-
miliar to colonial judges and to the men who framed the Constitution. Pri-
vacy, on the other hand, the intrusion of which is independent and distinct
from other torts, is a relatively recent concept usually associated with the
1890 article written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.' What these
two young lawyers had in mind, however, was an expansion of the available
common law remedies in effect at the time against physical intrusion (tres-
pass, assault) and proprietary interests (copyright) into a much broader
legal right "to be let alone"' as an antidote against the developing technolo-
gies of instantaneous photography, mass circulation publications, and me-
chanical devices capable of spying and snooping. Fearing that the existing
torts, which rested primarily upon property rights, carried inadequate legal
2 For a discussion of how modernity has blurred the public and private spheres, see H.
ARENDT, THE Hum.AN CoNrrIoN, at 22-78 (1958).
3 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). This article re-
mains a source of debate among scholars. One issue of contention centers on the reasons
which gave birth to the article. Prosser, in his frequently quoted article, Privacy, explained
that the catalyst for the article was the Boston papers' coverage of the marriage
of Warren's daughter in 1890, although Warren's annoyance with the local press had its
roots in the publicity given to his wife's parties in the gossip columns. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960), citing Brandeis' biographer, A. MASON, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S
LEFa, at 70 (1946). Don Pember on the other hand, insists in his PRIVACY AND THE PRESS, that
Warren's daughter was not married until 1905, fifteen years after publication of the article.
D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND Tm PRESS, 24 (1972). Pember's view is that the article was essen-
tially a brief of the upper class against the press practice of reporting gossip. Id. at 23.
After an analysis of four of the eight Boston papers in daily circulation at the time, Pember
concludes: "rhe evidence just does not support their indictment." Id. at 40.
The second debate, of more serious concern, relates to the significance of the concept
of privacy laid down in the article. Harry Kalven, Jr., characterized the tort as "petty" in
his article, Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966). He was rebutted by Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the
Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 Tax.
L. REV. 611 (1968). See also Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964), where Bloustein argues that privacy is
an unique right rather than four distinct torts under a common name. For a perspective
different than that of either Kalven or Bloustein, see Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19
LAw & CONTEMP. PRon. 203 (1954), where the author insists that the Warren and Brandeis
view of privacy is inadequate to meet the publicity/privacy problems posed by radio, tele-
vision, motion pictures, and commercial advertising.
4 The phrase originated in T. COOLEY, TORTS, at 29 (2d ed. 1888), where he wrote:
"The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone."
[Vol. 12:2
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remedies, Warren and Brandeis advocated a general right to privacy rooted
in an "inviolate personality."'
Admittedly, their article spawned a great debate in legal literature but
"had little immediate effect upon the law."7 Two early twentieth century
cases were split on the issue. In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,8
the New York Court of Appeals declined to recognize a common law right
to privacy. Three years later, in 1905, the Supreme Court of Georgia expli-
citly gave the right legal recognition in Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life
Insurance Co.9 For the next three or more decades, some state courts tended
to recognize the right by following Pavesich, while other courts denied its
existence under Roberson."0 Possibly encouraged by the publication of the
Restatement of Torts1 and the writings of the outstanding tort scholar, Dean
Prosser, 2 the number of states that gave legal recognition to the privacy
right either by statute or by common law grew to the extent that Prosser
could write in 1960 that twenty-six states and the District of Columbia had
formally accepted the right and a few other states were considering recogni-
tion." By 1978, all but three states-Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Wiscon-
5 Krause, The Right to Privacy in Germany-Pointers for American Legislation, 1965 Duin
LJ. 481, 485 n.11 (1965). The author notes that five years after the publication of the
Warren and Brandeis article, a German jurist, Otto von Gierke, wrote about a right of
personality which was distinct and separate from the more encompassing proprietary
right. Attempts to incorporate such a right into the German Civil Code were un-
successful until after World War I. The West German courts derived a "right of personality"
(Personlichkeitsrect) from the West German Constitution arts. I & 11 (1949). Id. at 20.
A number of American commentators from various disciplines have related the right of
privacy to personality and the development of the self. See, e.g., Bates, Privacy-A Useful
Concept, 42 Soc. FoRcEs 429 (1964); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE LJ. 475 (1968); Greenawalt,
Personal Privacy and the Law, 2 Wnsom Q. 67 (1978); Rachels, Why Privacy is Important,
4 PHI.. AND Pua. Arr. 323 (1975); J. RAji, ATrAcx ON PRiVACY (1974); C. SCHNEMER,
SiumE, EXPOSURE AND PRIVACY, at 40-41 (1977); and Wasserstrom, The Legal and Philoso-
phical Foundations of the Right to Privacy, (Feb. 1976) (unpublished paper).
6Krause, supra note 5, at 503 n.78, reported that THm INDEX TO LEoAL PERODICALS listed
some 440 articles, notes, and comments pertaining to the right of privacy between 1887 (three
years prior to the Warren and Brandeis article) and 1964. This author's count, covering
the period from 1965 to May 1978, reveals an additional 327 items, making a grand total
of 767 citations in the INDEX.
Prosser, supra note 3, at 384.
8 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
9 112 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
10 Prosser, supra note 3, at 386.
11 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867, at 398 (1939), where it is stated that liability would attach
to any person who "unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not
having his affairs known to others. .. "
" Possm, TORTS § 107 (1st ed. 1941).
13 Prosser, supra note 3, at 386-87.
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sin "-had recognized the right of privacy either by statute or by case law.' 5
However, Dean Prosser in his famous article on privacy,26 insisted that
there was no distinct or unique right to privacy, but rather that the concept of
privacy was a combination of four kinds of invasion, each representing an
interference with the "right to be let alone." He identified these four torts
as "(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs; (2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plain-
tiff; (3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye; and (4) Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness."' His view still prevails, as witnessed by the most recent
tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which, with minor
changes in wording, has incorporated Prosser's numbers two and three above
and reads: "(c) Unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life and
(d) Publicity which unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public."18 It is these two types of publicity which most frequently bring to
light the competing interests of privacy and the first amendment. The other
two types of publicity, intrusion and appropriation, will not be discussed
herein since they do not normally raise first amendment problems. Intrusion
is regarded as a physical trespass not privileged by the first amendment."
Appropriation is akin to a violation of a property right for commercial gain
which is also unlikely to raise the counterclaim of constitutional privilege.".
14 NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-481, 28-1127 (1975), where privacy is mentioned with regard to
elections, phone calls and threats. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-28 and 16-38-5 (Supp. 1977),
pertains to unauthorized use of a person's name, portrait or picture and to the use of
questionnaires. WIs. CoNsT. art. I, § 11 (1977), relates to searches and seizures only.
25Texas was the last state to recognize the right of privacy 83 years after the Warren
and Brandeis article by a judicial ruling in Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.
1973). For the historical background which led to the state supreme court ruling, see
Comment, A New Chapter in Texas Tort Law-The Right to Privacy, 10 Hous. L. REV.
1176 (1973).
18 Prosser, supra note 3.
IT Id. at 389.
'IRESTATEMENT (S-coND) OF TORTS § 652D & 652E (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976).
'
9 d. at § 652B. See also Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971), where
the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for the plaintiff on the reasoning that the
Time reporters had gained entrance into Dietemann's home by subterfuge and that, unknown
to the plaintiff, (an alleged "faith healer"), they were recording and transmitting what
occurred to a third party, the District Attorney of Los Angeles County. Judge Hufstedler
reminded the press that "The First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to
intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another's home or office." Id. at 249. For
a critique of the decision, see Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment,
76 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1205, 1282 (1976).
20 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, supra note 18, at § 625C. See also Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), where a plaintiff, known as the
"Human Cannonball," charged damages for "unlawful appropriation" of his professional
property, i.e., his act, by a local television station that replayed his act during its evening
program. By a 5-4 vote and on the narrow ground that the case fell within the state's right
to publicity law which protects proprietary, rather than reputational interest, the U.S.
[Vol. 12:2
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It is ironic that the United States Supreme Court has created a consti-
tutional right to privacy against governmental incursion in a line of cases
relating to marital relationships,2 contraceptives, 2 abortion,23 procreation,"4
and possession of obscene material within the home, while invasions of
privacy by individuals or nongovernmental institutions are left to state sta-
tutes and the law of torts for protection. It is when the public disclosure of
private facts which the individual seeks to protect from others comes in con-
flict with the public's right to know under the first amendment that the legiti-
mate, but competing, claims clash. How to reconcile these two genuine con-
cerns without causing serious harm to either individual privacy interests or
the community's legitimate interest in being informed about events that affect
it presents a considerable challenge to the law today.
II. THE SUPREME COURT ENTERS THE CONFLICT
Until 1964, state statutes and the common law controlled the field of
defamation. Since privacy is the progeny of libel, we must examine first how
the Court has treated defamation in order to better understand the current
dilemma of the tort of public disclosure.
Ever since the decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire," the Court
has explicitly ruled that libel is without constitutional protection. Of course,
the tort of privacy also was subject to limitations. Warren and Brandeis ad-
mitted to three legitimate constraints that could be imposed upon the right
to privacy, including: (1) the publication of material of general interest
which normally would be privileged under the law of libel; (2) the public
disclosure of personal information if the material was a matter of public
record; and (3) the publication of private facts or personal information if
the disclosure of such material was done with the individual's consent.
Hence, in their respective legal spheres, neither first amendment rights nor
the privacy tort was held to protect absolute values. What would happen if
the two competing but limited rights underlying those values were to confict?
The Court answered the question in a 1964 decision, New York Times
Supreme Court held that Zacchini was entitled to compensation under the state statute. The
dissenters questioned whether the consequences of the Court's opinion might not subject
the broadcasting media to liability for material presented in their news reports. Id. at 580.
Should the minority's fears be realized, it is conceivable that the appropriation tort could
raise first amendment concerns.
21 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
23 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24 Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
25 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
2 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
27 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 214-18.
5
Giglio: Unwanted Publicity and the News Media
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1979
AKRON LAw REVIEW
v. Sullivan,8 where it adopted the position that the old common law of strict
liability libel, which had developed over the centuries, was now inconsistent
with the first amendment guarantees of speech and press when applied to
public officials. Not only could erroneous statements be made about the con-
duct of public officials in performing their duties, but to be awarded damages,
the plaintiff had to prove that the statement was printed with "actual malice;"
i.e., "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not."2 This burden exceeded the traditionally
accepted burden for the tort which required proof that the state-
ments were indeed false and that the publication was indeed negligent.
Later that term, the Court reaffirmed the standard as requiring proof that the
statement was false or made with reckless disregard of the truth in a case
involving a local district attorney's critical comments to the press concerning
the official conduct of the judges in his district.3° Both holdings were reason-
able in light of the particular factual circumstances of each case. In the
New York Times case, the Court may have had two concerns. First, the
Justices may have felt a commitment to the civil rights movement; second,
they were possibly apprehensive that the substantial damages 1 awarded
against a paper that had sold only 400 copies in the entire state would serve
as a warning to other liberal newspapers of what southern juries had in store
for them. In the Garrison case, the Court understandably ruled unconstitu-
tional the state's criminal defamation statute because of the threat it posed
to dissenting public officials and to the media that subsequently would repro-
duce the criticisms as a means of promoting public debate.
The effect of the Court's reasoning in New York Times is somewhat
analagous to its entrance into the obscenity thicket in Roth v. United States;
32
the Court has spent more than a decade either explaining, modifying, or re-
fining its original decisions. With one foot in the libel field, the Court pro-
ceeded to "muddy the waters" with subsequent rulings.
A. From Public Official to Public Figure
Two questions were left unresolved by New York Times. One concerned
28 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29 Id. at 280. The Court used the term "actual malice" here to distinguish it from common
law malice, which meant spite or ill will. The lower courts, nevertheless, confused the
terms. See L. ThIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrrTIONAL LAw, at 634-35. n.21 (1978). The con-
fusion reached such proportions that Justice Brennan recommended that trial courts omit
reference to the phrase "actual malice" in their instructions to the jury. See Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971).
30 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
31 The $500,000 libel judgment awarded Sullivan, without having to prove any real pecuniary
loss, was 1,000 times greater than the minimum fine provided under the Alabama criminal
libel statute and 100 times greater than the fine under the Sedition Act. 376 U.S. at 277.
32 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
[Vol. 12:2
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the parameters of the "public official" category and the other related to the
meaning of "malice." The two issues were interrelated since under the New
York Times standard, courts first had to determine whether the plaintiff met
the public official classification and second, whether the information reported
or printed about the plaintiff met the "actual malice" test.
Justice Brennan, who spoke for the majority in the New York Times case,
recognized the failure of the Court in that case to provide guidelines as to the
outer reaches of the "public officials" category or even to specify the level in the
hierarchy of government officials that the Justices had in mind when they
created the category. Sullivan, supervisor of the Montgomery, Alabama
police department, and Garrison, a district attorney in Louisiana, clearly
fell within the public official category. But were public officials restricted only
to those elected or appointed to public office? In an attempt to clarify the
issue, Justice Brennan wrote in a broadcast defamation case that: "the
'public official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hier-
archy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have,
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental
affairs."" This explanation failed to satisfy Justice Douglas. In his concur-
ring opinion, Douglas stated that if what the Court wanted to protect under
the first amendment was the open discussion of public issues, then clearly
there would be no way for courts to draw the line as to which employees on
the public payroll would qualify under the "public official" standard. Con-
ceivably the category was so open-ended that it could include everyone from
the clerk-typist to the night watchman. Since the Court had invented the
"public official" category, Douglas suggested that it could determine its
boundary."
Taking its cue from the Douglas concurrence in the Baer case above,
the Court took the opportunity in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Asso-
ciated Press v. Walker, reported together the following year, 5 to apply the
New York Times "public official" classification to defamatory statements
printed about the public conduct of public figures, in these cases, a football
coach, Butts, and a former general, Walker. The Walker classification is logic-
al on its face. Walker, a retired career officer who had a public record of state-
ments indicating his opposition to integration, was present on the campus of the
University of Mississippi during the riots surrounding the enrollment of James
33Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). According to L. TRIBE, supra note 29, at
636; the term "public official" has come to embrace virtually all persons affiliated with
the government, including civil servants, public school teachers, and police officers.
3* 383 U.S. at 89-90.
35388 U.S. 130 (1967). Butts' damages award was affirmed but Walker's was reversed.
In the opinion of this author, the damages awarded to Butts may have contributed to the
demise of the Saturday Evening Post.
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Meredith as the first black student ever admitted to the University. However,
categorizing Wally Butts, coach of the University of Georgia football team,
as a public figure is dubious indeed. Did the Justices intend that every coach
from college on down to Little League and "Pop" Warner were "public figures"
when it came to suing the local newspaper? Did the Butts decision imply that
anyone in the public eye could qualify as a public figure?
The problem with the "public figure" category is that, unlike the "public
official," the former classification is even more vague and open to arbitrary
designations. Certain persons are obvious public figures, such as Ralph Nader
and Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis. But what about Justice Douglas' examples
of a clerk-typist or a night watchman? Both are on the public payrolls, but
would that fact alone make them public figures? It is very unlikely. Suppose,
however, that either one uncovers damaging evidence against the agency that
employs them and passes the information on to their superior. The media
somehow manages to obtain that information and publicizes it. Are they now
public figures, like Oliver Sipple, inadvertently thrust into the vortex of public
controversy?
B. The Court Expands and Retrenches
What about the private individual who is neither a "public official" nor
a "public figure" as defined by the courts, but who, nevertheless, becomes
involved in a news event? The Court had its first opportunity to deal witl
this issue in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 6 In Rosenbloom, a distributor
of nudist magazines who had been arrested for possession of obscene mater-
ials, brought a libel action against a radio station that had failed in two of
its news broadcasts to describe the seized materials as "allegedly" obscene.
A sharply divided Court,37 on the authority of New York Times v. Sullivan,
refused to allow recovery by the plaintiff. Justice Brennan managed to secure
four Justices to join in the judgment by the Court, but only the Chief Justice
and Justice Blackmun supported his view that the New York Times standard
applied to the plaintiff. In an attempt to shift the libel test from the person
to the nature of the event, Justice Brennan formulated a "public interest" test:
Whether the person involved is a famous large-scale magazine distribu-
tor or a "private businessman running a corner news stand" has no rele-
36403 U.S. 29 (1971). The treatment of the Rosenbloom case in the lower courts is illus-
trative of the confusion surrounding the New York Times ruling. The federal district
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding the New York Times standard inapplicable, 289
F. Supp. 737 (1968); while the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, applying the same standard,
held in favor of the defendant radio station. 415 F.2d 892 (3rd Cir. 1969).
7 There was no majority opinion. Five members of the Court agreed that the first amend-
ment barred recovery. The judgment of the Court was announced by Justice Brennan
in an opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. Justices Black and
White concurred in separate opinions. Justices Stewart and Marshall joined in a dissenting
opinion.
[Vol. 12:2
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vance in ascertaining whether the public has an interest in the issue.
We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is
embodied in the First Amendment by extending constitutional protection
to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or gen-
eral concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous
or anonymous."
As a distributor of nudist magazines throughout the Philadelphia metro-
politan area, George Rosenbloom must have been astonished to learn that
he was of public interest, yet his arrest and the pressure on the station to
prepare a "hot news item" for its daily broadcasts brought the station within
the rubric of this expanded view of the New York Times rule. What the
sharply divided Rosenbloom Court was saying, in effect, was that the media
could make legitimate mistakes under the pressure of meeting deadlines so
long as the statements made related to some public interest and there was
insufficient proof of any reckless disregard for the truth.
More recently, the Court denied certiorari in a case from the Second
Circuit finding a publisher immune even to recklessness charges. In that case,
the publication identified the allegedly defamatory material as representing
the viewpoint of a responsible organization, the National Audubon Society,
and not the personal views of the publisher. In addition, the evidence sup-
ported the view that the story was objectively and accurately reported. 9 This
case led one legal commentator to remark: "Recklessness may not be in-
ferred from a publisher's failure to inquire into a matter's truth or falsity,
although a responsible publisher might well have inquired. In the world of
New York Times v. Sullivan, ignorance is bliss.""0
The fragile Rosenbloom plurality did not last long. In Gertz v. Welch,"'
Rosenbloom was clearly repudiated as the Court retreated from its applica-
tion of the New York Times standard to libelous actions brought by private
individuals. The Court quietly laid to rest Justice Brennan's "public interest"
test when it held that Gertz, an attorney, was not a public figure but a private
individual. Gertz was representing the family of a youth who had been fatally
shot by a police officer. After the state prosecuted and convicted the officer,
the youth's family retained Gertz for civil litigation against the officer. The
defendent Welch published American Opinion, a monthly organ of the John
Birch Society. In an article alleging a national Communist conspiracy against
local law enforcement agencies, Gertz was accused of being the architect of
a conspiracy to frame the convicted police officer. The article also charged
38 403 U.S. at 43-44.
39 Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
sub. nonm. Edwards v. N.Y. Times, 98 S. Ct. 647 (1977).
40 L. TRmE, supra note 29, at 638.
41418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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Gertz with being a past member of a Communist front organization and a
member of the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy. 2 The article con-
tained a number of inaccuracies, prompting Gertz to file a defamation action
against the magazine. The trial judge found that Gertz was neither a public
official nor a public figure, but an ordinary citizen. However, since Gertz was
unable to prove actual malice on the part of the publication, he could not
recover damages.4 In a decision equal in importance to New York Times v.
Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court reversed. In so doing, the Court
narrowed its definition of public figure considerably so as to exclude a repu-
table member of the legal profession, one who had published his autobiog-
raphy and had among his clients Jack Ruby and Nathan Leopold."
The basis for the reversal was the Court's formulation of a new libel
standard for private individuals. No longer is it necessary for a private citizen
to show actual malice in order to recover damages in a defamation action.
Unlike the public figure, a private citizen has not voluntarily put himself in
the public eye and has no expectation of false comments being publicly made
against him. The private citizen also does not have the access of a public
figure to the media to effectively rebut the defamatory statements. As the
Court stated, "private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury
than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of re-
covery.""2 Nevertheless, the Court plainly stated that the first amendment had
changed the common law rules pertaining to defamation of private persons.
The states can no longer impose "liability without fault"'6 in order to allow
recovery of actual damages; 7 even a private citizen has the burden of proving
62 Id. at 325-27.
i "322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
"4 Stanford Professor of Law John Kaplan made this statement in his TEACHE't" MANUAL
for the W. COHEN & 1. KAPLAN text, BILL OF RIGirrs, at 46-47 (1977). Strangely, the Court
failed to mention Gertz' clients. One possible reason for the Court's failure to do so is
that it would have made the determination that Gertz was a private individual more difficult.
45 418 U.S. at 345.
46 ld. at 347.
47 Actual damages may be awarded to a complainant as compensation for the real loss or
injury suffered. Actual damages in libel and invasion of privacy cases, although they do not
lend themselves to fixed dollar amounts, represent payment for the humiliation, embarrassment
or mental anguish suffered. Exemplary or punitive damages are awarded when the wrong
committed was aggravated by malice, fraud or oppressive conduct by the defendant and
are intended to solace the plaintiff or, in some instances, to punish the defendant for the
evil conduct. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, at 466-69 (4th ed. 1951). Negligence refers
to the doing of something or the failure to do something which a reasonable person would
ordinarily be expected to either do or not do. Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary
care; it is accidental or inadvertent. It is not characterized by recklessness or willfulness.
Id. at 1184-86. Under the New York Times v. Sullivan rule a public official had to prove
more than negligence (i.e., malice) in order to recover damages. Under the Gertz standard, if
the plaintiff is classified by the Court as a private person and can prove negligence, he
can recover actual damages. Punitive damages are recoverable only if the plaintiff can
show that the defendant knew that the material was false or that the defendant published
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that the publisher had been at least negligent. Furthermore, the awarding of
punitive damages requires that there be evidence of recklessness or knowl-
edge of falsity on the part of the defendant. ' In other words, the constitu-
tional guarantees of speech and press now require a showing of fault in order
to hold media defendants liable for defamation. But how high is the fault
standard? Does negligence suffice or does there have to be recklessness? One
case that had all of the requirements to further compound the judicial con-
fusion was a divorce case containing the ingredients of a Norman Lear soap
opera.
C. Mary Firestone: The "Private" Public Person
The scenario in Time, Inc. v. Firestone" read as follows. In scene one,
Mary Firestone is seeking separation from her husband, Russell Firestone,
wealthy industrialist, after three years of marriage. Mrs. Firestone files a
complaint for separate maintenance in West Palm Beach. Subsequently, her
husband files a countersuit for divorce, charging extreme cruelty and adultery.
The trial judge grants the divorce due to lack of domestication, since the
Firestones apparently are not living together.50 On appeal, the Florida Supreme
Court upholds the divorce decree, but on the grounds of extreme cruelty."
As to the emotional testimony of both parties relating to their extramarital
sexual activities, the trial judge dismisses much of this evidence as "un-
reliable."52
Scene two takes place in the New York office of Time magazine where
news of the divorce comes over the wire services and an account of the judg-
ment rendered is printed in a New York newspaper. Time also has a Miami
bureau and a "stringer" who is working on special assignment in the Miami
area: both confirm news of the divorce to the New York office. Will Time
print the story? Based on the four separate sources of information, Time
prints the following piece under its "Milestones" section:
DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone, Jr., 41, heir to the tire fortune:
Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime Palm Beach
school teacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery; after six
years of marriage, one son; in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month
the statements with a reckless disregard for its falsity. Therefore, under the Gertz standard,
a public official or a public figure needs to prove malice in order to recover damages; the
private individual can receive actual damages by showing merely negligence.
48 418 U.S. at 349.
49424 U.S. 448 (1976).
5OFirestone v. Firestone, 263 So.2d 223 (1972).
51 Id.
52 1d
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intermittent trial produced enough testimony of extramarital adventures
on both sides, said the judge, "to make Dr. Freud's hair curl."5
The third scene finds Mary Firestone requesting a written retraction
from Time alleging that part of the article is false, malicious, and defamatory.
Time refuses to retract the piece. Scene four finds both parties in court. Will
Mary Firestone win against the overwhelming forces of the multicorporation?
Will the jury believe that this former school teacher could be adulterous?
On television, the outcome more likely would depend on how long the series
would last, but in West Palm Beach, Florida, the jury believes Mrs. Firestone
and the court awards her $100,000 in damages. " In the final scene, Time
appeals the state court judgment to the United States Supreme Court on
constitutional grounds, arguing that the ruling violates its rights under the
first amendment. Voting five to three, the Supreme Court holds that Mary
Firestone is not a public figure, 5 but a private individual similar to attorney
Gertz and remands the case back to the state court for a determination of the
magazine's fault under the Gertz standard.
Why is Mary Firestone, a woman who married into a family that ranks
a cut below the Rockefellers and the Fords, not a public figure for defamation
purposes? Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist explained:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of
especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of
such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures
for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.5"
Justice Rehnquist determined that Mrs. Firestone did not meet either qualifi-
cation; and, thus, could not be classified as a "public figure." In reaching
this conclusion, Justice Rehnquist made it a point to emphasize that the
Gertz majority had repudiated the Rosenbloom plurality (Brennan, Black-
mun and Burger) who would have extended the New York Times privilege
to defamatory statements about private individuals when such falsehoods
were related to the general or public interest. In his concluding remarks,
Rehnquist opined that a divorce proceeding is not the kind of public contro-
versy that the Court had in mind when it decided the Gertz case.",
53 424 U.S. at 452. The three year time differential is due to the fact that when the divorce
proceedings began, the Firestones had been married for three years. The Time article was
not published until three years later.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 453.
WId., quoting Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. at 345.
57 424 U.S. at 448.
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Once the Court had disposed of the private versus public question, a
second issue remained; i.e., the issue of fault. Addressing himself to this
question, Justice Rehnquist observed that under Florida law a wife found
guilty of adultery could not be awarded alimony, and since Mrs. Firestone
had been granted alimony, the divorce could not have rested on the adultery
criterion." The Time article, however, described the grounds for the divorce
as being "extreme cruelty and adultery," an obvious falsehood. Quoting from
the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida, Rehnquist remarked:
A careful examination of the final decree prior to publication would
have clearly demonstrated that the divorce had been granted on the
grounds of extreme cruelty, and thus the wife would have been saved
the humiliation of being accused of adultery in a nationwide magazine.
This is a flagrant example of "journalistic negligence."'
Justice Marshall's dissent rested, not without some justification, on his
judgment that Mary Firestone was indeed a "public figure" within the mean-
ing of Gertz and Butts. Marshall pointed to the following facts as documen-
tation: Mrs. Firestone was an active member of Palm Beach society, she was
a socialite whose name appeared frequently in the local press, she subscribed
to a press-clipping service, and she had held press conferences during the
divorce proceedings. Unlike the ordinary private person, Mary Firestone had
access to the media and belonged to a social group that received constant
attention from the print and broadcasting media.60
While there is merit to the Marshall dissent, it fails to provide us with
criterion for a consistent standard. Indeed the entire Court's application of
the public figure standards in defamation cases lacks consistency and gives
substance to the charge that the Justices are reaching their determinations
on a case-by-case basis. The drawing of judicial lines is not a scientific en-
deavor, but there should be some thread of logic to a line of cases. The
public/private dichotomy enmeshes the Court in making the kinds of deter-
minations that leave it vulnerable to accusations of arbitrariness. Surely,
reason alone does not support a judicial determination that in libel actions,
a college football coach is a public figure, while a prominent attorney and
a noted socialite are private individuals. If the Court persists in utilizing the
public/private classification scheme, it is respectfully suggested that it de-
58 Id. at 458.
591d. at 463, quoting from the lower court's decision, 305 So.2d at 178. One cynical com-
mentator responded to the Rehnquist rationale by writing: "the Firestone majority decided
that gossip about the rich and famous is not a matter of legitimate public interest." See
L TIBE, supra note 29, at 645.
6O 424 U.S. at 484-85. For commentary on the Supreme Court's decision, see Comment,
Private Defamation: Mary Firestone, Mary Firestone?, 8 N.C. CENT. LJ. 109 (1976);
Note, Media Liability for Libel of Newsworthy Persons Before and Alter Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 5 FLA. ST. L. REv. 446 (1977).
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velop a rational principle or set of guidelines which lower courts can apply
with some degree of consistency.
D. The Private "Involuntary" Public Figure
The Gertz decision recognized three categories of public figures. One
category includes individuals who have fame and notoriety in the community,
as well as those who hold public office, and are considered by the courts to
be public persons for all purposes. 1 A second group consists of those persons
who have chosen voluntarily to thrust themselves into the public arena in
order to resolve issues that affect the political, economic, educational, and
social life of the community.62 These two categories were reaffirmed by
Justice Rehnquist in the Firestone case. 3 However, Gertz made reference to
a third category, that of the private individual like Oliver Sipple, who is
thrust into the national arena due to circumstances or events over which the
person has little or no control. The Gertz majority agreed that instances of
"involuntary public figures" should be "exceedingly rare." If the Court
was thinking solely of defamation situations, its prediction would withstand
critical scrutiny. But if the Justices were thinking at all about "invasion of
privacy" suits (and they should have been for reasons which will become
obvious shortly), then their prognosis was shortsighted and bears little
relationship to the current state of "investigative journalism" and "instanta-
neous news" where being there first with the news or getting the highest
program ratings is the god which all the networks worship.
Had the Court any foresight it might have reached a different con-
clusion after Time, Inc. v. Hill5 on how common it is for an individual or
a family to become the focus of unwanted publicity. The Hills were an
ordinary family living in Pennsylvania, until one day in 1952, when three
escaped convicts entered their home and held them captive for nineteen
hours. The family was treated decently and released unharmed. The next
year Joseph Hayes wrote a novel, The Desperate Hours, based on their ordeal.
For dramatic effect, the book contained some violence as well as name
changes. As frequently is the case, the novel became a play and then a
movie." What raised the legal issues was an article in Life magazine, owned
61 418 U.S. at 342.
- Id. at 351.
63 424 U.S. at 453.
64 Id.
65 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
66 The Hayes play opened on Broadway, February 10, 1955, with actor Karl Malden as the
father and Paul Newman as the leader of the convicts. The family's name had been changed
from Hill to Hilliard. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1955, at 20, col. 2. The film version opened
later that year with Fredric March as the father and Humphrey Bogart as the gang leader.
See id. Oct. 6, 1955, at 25, col, 1 for a review of the film.
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by Time, Inc., entitled, "True Crime Inspires Tense Play." The article con-
tained photos of the stage cast acting out scenes in the Hills' Pennsylvania
home. Mr. Hill felt that he and his family had been falsely portrayed in the
article and filed suit under the New York Privacy Law."' After fairly com-
plicated litigation,68 the New York courts awarded the Hills $30,000 for
invasion of privacy. The argument of Time, Inc. before the United States
Supreme Court was that the article was a subject of public interest privileged
under the first amendment and that the piece was written and published
without malice. The Court reversed and sent the case back for a new trial. 9
For our purposes, two important constitutional views emerge from the
Hill decision. First, the Hills were considered by the Court to be public fig-
ures, newsworthy persons, three years after the actual event had occurred.
The family had sold their home and moved to another state in an attempt
to avoid national publicity. Did the Court intend to imply an "involuntary
public figure" who has recaptured his privacy can be made "public" again
at the pleasure of the media so long as what is printed or broadcast or filmed
is accurate? Second, the first amendment was used to limit the scope of the
privacy tort. In New York Times, the Court had applied the first amendment
to libel suits, albeit with certain reservations. In Hill, the first amendment
privilege was extended to the privacy tort by restricting the recovery of dam-
ages for privacy invasion."0 Since the Hills were considered by the Court
to be public figures, the recovery of damages required a showing of actual
malice under the New York Times test.'1
More recently, in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.,"2 a newspaper
was sued for depicting the plaintiff in a false light in an article concerning a
tragedy that occurred eight months previously. The Cantrells filed a privacy
suit against the Cleveland Plain Dealer for a follow-up story involving a
bridge disaster which killed forty-four persons, including Mr. Cantrell. The
story was based on an interview with the family during which time fifty photos
were taken. Among other false statements, the article featured comments
about Mrs. Cantrell which gave the impression that she had been present
during the interview when, in fact, she had not. The parties, and the trial
court, proceeded upon the presumption that the action fell under the rubric
67 N.Y. Cirv. RIGHTS LAW 50-51 (McKinney).
68See 385 U.S. at 379-80.
*6 384 U.S. at 378-80.
"Old. at 395-96.
I'The Court admitted that the constitutional question in this case was narrowly limited to
the "failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury that a verdict of liability could be pre-
dicated only on a finding of knowing or reckless falsity in the publication of the Life article."
Id. at 397.
72419 U.S. 245 (1974).
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of the New York Times actual malice test."3 The Supreme Court agreed with
the trial court that the paper had been reckless since the reporter knew there
were falsehoods in the story.7" The question, of course, is whether the Court
would have denied recovery by the Cantrells' had there been no showing
of malice, even though the collapse of a bridge is hardly "hot news" eight
months later.
Crime, on the other hand, is always of general concern. Yet is the
identification of a rape victim a proper exercise of the free expression
privilege under the first amendment or is it an invasion of privacy? In Cox
Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn,3 station WSB-TV was sued by the
father of a murder-rape victim under a Georgia statute' which makes it
a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the name or identity of a rape victim.
The reporter had obtained the name of the victim from the trial indictments
against the defendants. The state courts upheld the statute as a reasonable
restraint on the exercise of free expression, but the United States Supreme
Court reversed, eight to one, with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting. Justice
White, writing for the Court, said that the Court did not have to reach the
privacy claim since the television reporter had based his newscast on notes
taken at the court proceedings. White observed that court records are open
to the public and that the commission of a crime and its subsequent prose-
cution are newsworthy events which are properly within the responsibility of
the media. 7 To foreclose the prospects of damage recovery for invasion
of privacy in future similar situations, White explicitly held that privacy
interests are diminished, if not abolished per se, if the information disclosed
is already a matter of public record and if the privacy right conflicts with
the constitutional mandate under the first amendment for a vigorous
press."'
These cases indicate that in any direct confrontation between the first
amendment privilege and privacy interests, the latter will most frequently lose
out where the facts are true or the errors are made without malice. Yet the
T
3 Id. at 249-50.
T4 Id. at 253-54.
75420 U.S. 469 (1975).
76 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972).
T 420 U.S. at 491-92. One commentator opined that the decision left unclear whether the
name of a rape victim is newsworthy or a matter of public interest per se or whether
publication of the victim's name is restricted to official court records. See Comment, Right
of Privacy Versus Freedom of the Press-The Press Cannot be Restrained for Reporting
Facts Contained in Official Court Records, 24 EMORY L.I. 1205, 1223 (1975). See also
Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. District Ct., 430 U.S. 308 (1977); where, per curiam, the Court re-
versed a ruling of the state supreme court which had upheld an order of the district court
enjoining the press from publishing the name or picture of a minor child involved in juvenile
proceedings on first amendment grounds.
78 420 U.S. at 494-95.
(Vol  12:2
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 12 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss2/2
Fall, 1978] SY PoSIM: UNWANTED PUBLICITY AND THE NEWS MEDIA 245
Hills, Cantrells, and Mr. Cohn's daughter were all victims who became
newsworthy due to events over which they had no control. Surely a reason-
able argument could be advanced that all three had suffered enough and
were morally, if not legally, entitled to be left alone. Does a hostage have
a right to be able to forget the past? Does a rape victim have a right not to
have her humiliation publicized beyond judicial records and the courtroom?
Does a family have a right not to be reminded in the media of the loss
of a loved one? Apparently, the current state of constitutional law mandates
that if the event, story, or material published or broadcast is "newsworthy,"
it cannot, under the first amendment, become an invasion of privacy re-
gardless of whether the individual involved is a public official, public
figure, or private citizen.
E. Privacy and the Newsworthy Defense
The privacy cases previously discussed tend to support the view that
when privacy interests clash with the first amendment guarantees of speech
and press, the Court generally relegates the privacy value of the individual
to a position secondary to the community's right to be informed. So long
as the law places great weight on the constitutional standard of "news-
worthiness" in privacy cases, it really does not matter whether the public
disclosure is true or false except when the plaintiff can prove recklessness.
Defamation, and instances when the media represents an individual
in a false light, tend to overlap and are often commingled. As a consequence,
privacy has not been given its rightful due by the courts. Defamation relates
to reputational interests, which is why, for the past century at least, truth
has been a defense to the charge. If the falsehoods are proven, damages
are awarded because the defamed individual has suffered humiliation and
has lost esteem in the community. As lago said to Othello: "Who steals
my purse steals trash .... But, he that filches from me my good name
robs me of that which not enriches him, and makes me poor indeed." In
contrast to defamation, the public disclosure of accurate personal infor-
mation involves more than reputation. The heart of the privacy wrong lies
in those values related to the human spirit: self-esteem, dignity, and liberty
in the sense of control over information about oneself.T
Currently, the law relegates these values to second class status when
public disclosure is a matter of general or public concern. Resolving these
conflicting values depends upon what determinant is used for the news-
worthy standard. One possibility is to allow the news media to set its own
standards." This appears to be the view accepted by the courts, since whatever
is printed or broadcast (short of libel or slander) becomes "news" and is
79 See notes 2 and 5 supra.
80 See text accompanying notes 121-128 infra.
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automatically privileged under the first amendment. Such a sweeping stan-
dard makes it extremely difficult to recover damages under an invasion of
privacy action. A second alternative would be to allow contemporary com-
munity "mores," similar to "contemporary community standards" in ob-
scenity cases,8 to determine newsworthiness. In a privacy action this would
put the matter squarely upon the jury to determine initially whether the
material complained of is what the community wants to read, see, and hear.
It is hard to predict how privacy interests would fare under this kind of
"Russian roulette" approach. It certainly would play havoc with publishers
and broadcasting stations, forcing them to speculate on how a jury might
decide on a particular news story. A third option, one which Warren and
Brandeis proposed in their 1890 article,82 would be to allow privacy recovery
regardless of whether a mass audience exists for gossip, personal intimacies,
and material that tends to appeal to the baser instincts. Under this option,
privacy interests would receive maximum protection. However, adherence
to this standard comes very close to news censorship and would likely place
the courts, especially at the appellate level, in the position of sitting as a
judicial board of censors.
None of the positions above is acceptable or feasible. A standard of
newsworthiness is needed that is compatible with the value of privacy re-
gardless of the persons involved. Both Prosser" and the courts admit to
allowing the public official and public figure a much smaller zone of privacy
than that accorded to the private citizen. This distinction between the public
and private figure leads to much difficulty, however. The Hills and the Can-
trells, for example, fall within that "gray zone;" arguably neither public nor
private figures. I propose that even undisputed public figures such as Ralph
Nader and Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis are entitled to be free from un-
wanted publicity and from the constant pressure of living in a society where
the Constitution permits the media to disclose every private fact about their
81 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
30-31 (1973); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974).
8 2 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3. The authors described the journalism of their day in
these terms:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become
a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste
the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in columns of the daily papers to
occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with gossip, which can only be
procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle ....
A3 Prosser, supra note 3, at 410, defined a public figure as a celebrity, including in his list:
actors, entertainers, professional athletes, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes, child
prodigies and a broad category of public officers; i.e., anyone who had achieved some degree
of reputation by appearing before the public. Prosser's definition has limited applicability in
privacy cases since it does not address itself to individuals like the Hill family, the Cantrells,
Cohn, and Sipple who involuntarily become newsworthy figures.
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daily activities. To support this proposal, it is helpful to examine some of
the more critical cases concerning privacy.
During his investigation into the automobile industry in the prepa-
ration of his book on auto safety, Ralph Nader filed suit against General
Motors charging, among other things, invasion of privacy.8" Nader main-
tained that the corporation had hired people to keep him under constant
surveillance, to gather information regarding his political, social, racial and
religious views and his sex activities, to entrap him in embarrassing circum-
stances by having women solicit him for immoral purposes, and to make
obnoxious and harrassing phone calls.8" Although two lower courts denied
General Motors' motion to dismiss the invasion of privacy charge," the
Court of Appeals of New York agreed only that the corporation had com-
mitted a tortious intrusion into Nader's privacy by their unauthorized bug-
ging and wiretapping. They were unsympathetic to the invasion of privacy
charge regarding all of Nader's other allegations, remarking: "Privacy is
invaded only if the information sought is of confidential nature and the de-
fendant's conduct was unreasonably intrusive."88 Without the physical in-
trusion through the illegal electronic surveillance, the New York Court of
Appeals was of the opinion that that intrusion into Nader's privacy including
his right to be left alone by private investigators, snoopers, soliciting women,
was annoying and inconvenient, but certainly not actionable.89
Some years after the assassination of President Kennedy, Mrs. Kennedy
married a Greek tycoon, Aristotle Onassis. As a socialite, the former wife
of a United States Senator who later became President, and a member of
the Kennedy clan, Mrs. Onassis was no stranger to publicity. However,
unlike many other public figures and celebrities who often ignore publicity,
Mrs. Onassis drew the line against unwanted interference with her freedom
and intrusion into her privacy. The result was Galella v. Onassis,9° where
the facts of the case parallel, but far exceed, the circumstances that led
Warren and Brandeis to write their article on privacy more than seventy
years before.
"Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647
(1970).
85 Id.
86 57 Misc.2d 301, 292 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 1968), afi'd, 31 App. Div. 2d 392, 298 N.Y.S.2d
137 (1969).
87 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647.
881 Id. at 568, 255 N.E.2d at 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 647. Reportedly, the suit was settled out of
court for $425,000. See Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 70.
89 25 N.Y.2d at 568, 255 N.E.2d at 769, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
90 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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The case arose when a free-lance photographer, Ronald Galella (a
self-proclaimed paparazzo),9 brought suit against Mrs. Onassis and three
Secret Service agents assigned to protect her children. Galella charged
false arrest, malicious prosecution, and interference with his profession.
Galella sought injunctive relief and $1.3 million in damages. Mrs. Onassis
filed a countersuit seeking $1.5 million in damages in addition to injunctive
relief from Galena, who, she claimed, invaded her privacy, harrassed and
assaulted her and her children, and inflicted emotional distress on them.
The district judge initially denied summary judgment to both parties, but
five months later the judge dismissed Galella's complaint and awarded
injunctive relief to Mrs. Onassis on the basis of the photographer's conduct
since the original judgment."2 In awarding permanent injunctive relief to
the defendant, the judge cited twelve pages of Galela's activities before
and since the initial litigation. The illustrations were culled from the more
than 4,000 pages of trial record. The evidence against this paparazzo far
exceeded the so-called "yellow journalism" of the late nineteenth century.
Galella's tortious conduct lived up to his metaphorical description as an
"annoying bug" as he hid behind bushes in Central Park and behind coat-
racks in New York's most exclusive restaurants and then suddenly, leaping
out and taking photos of Mrs. Onassis and the children, successfully
captured on fim their startled and frightened faces." Admittedly, Galella
was a photographer with imagination, and aspiring journalists might admire
his chutzpah for his inventiveness, clever disguises, and creative deceptions,
but is this the kind of free expression by the media protected under the
first amendment even against a public figure's sense of privacy? The district
judge in replying negatively to the question, echoed Meiklejohn's view that
the framers of the amendment intended it to relate to matters of self govern-
ance. ' The fact that Jacqueline Onassis is a public figure is indisputable,
but the judge drew a distinction between the activities of public figures
that relate to public affairs and the Galella brand of journalism that merely
satisfies public curiousity: "l-t cannot be said that information about her
comings and goings, her tastes in ballet, the food that she eats, and other
minutiae . .. bear significantly upon public questions or otherwise 'enable
the members of society to cope with the experiences of their period.' "9
The judge granted permanent injunctive relief, setting distance guide-
lines that Galella must follow in photographing the Onassis family in
91 Galella described himself as "the world's only American paparazzi." Id. at 216. News-
week defined paparazzo as an "annoying bug." Id.
92 353 F.Supp. at 235.
93 For a description of Galella's activities, see id. at 207-219.
9Id. at 225, citing Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HAv. L. REv. 1, 12 (1965).
95 Id. at 225.
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public." Galella appealed the ruling,"7 which was affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals. On the apparent rationale that the original distance
guidelines set for Galella bordered on prior restraint, the appeals court
modified considerably the distances the photographer was required to main-
tain. 8 The modification had the effect of substantially diluting the purpose
of the original injunction. Without much explanation or justification, the
court of appeals majority substituted its own distance guidelines for those
of the lower court, thereby rendering Mrs. Onassis' victory shallow, indeed.
Under the modification, Galella was free, as before, to prowl around the
Onassis home at will, to be fairly close to Mrs. Onassis and to be near the
children except in their school or play areas. Even an amateur photographer,
without sophisticated equipment, could secure closeup pictures from distances
of twenty-five to thirty feet. The modification was arbitrary and at odds
with the trial evidence.99 It would not prevent Galella from interfering
with the family's privacy nor with their freedom of movement. The majority
opinion carries the first amendment privilege to the brink of absolutism.
It is lacking in both historical support and in giving rightful recognition to
the importance of privacy to the human personality, whether that of a public
figure or private person.
Where does the law of privacy stand today? Public figures such as
Nader and Jacqueline Onassis have virtually no privacy so long as there
is no physical intrusion or unreasonable conduct by the news media. Private
persons who become newsworthy, like the Hills and Cantrells, lose all right
to privacy unless the media gets the facts wrong and then prints or broad-
casts those falsehoods with malice. The lesson of the Cohn case is that when-
ever a private individual becomes part of an official court record, or per-
9 6 Depending on the circumstance, Galella was to keep a distance of 50 to 100 yards from
the Onassis family. 353 F. Supp. 196, 241. See note 98, infra.
97 Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
9 8 The various distances that Galella was required to maintain are set out below:
DISTANCES GALELLA AS PROVIDED IN AS MODIFIED BY
IS REQUIRED TO DISTRICT COURT COURT OF APPEALS
MAINTAIN INJUNCTION MAJORITY
From home of Mrs.
Onassis and her children 100 yards No restriction
From children's schools 100 yards Restricted only from
entering schools or play
areas
From Mrs. Onassis
personally 50 yards 25 feet and not to
touch her
From children personally 75 yards 30 feet
Id. at 1001.
9 9 See id. at 1001-04 (concurring opinion of Judge Timbers).
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haps any other official record, he automatically becomes newsworthy and
surrenders his privacy right. The line of Supreme Court cases from New York
Times to Firestone reveals judicial inconsistency in determining who is a public
figure or a private person in defamation cases. This confusion has carried
over into the privacy area. One legal scholar noted that the lack of guidance
from the Supreme Court has allowed the lower courts to treat the con-
stitutional limitations on the public disclosure of private facts disparately.' °
His study revealed that state and appellate courts were, in effect, applying
five different standards in privacy invasion cases.' This is the reason why
the time has come to examine proposals that are intended to reconcile the
competing privacy interest of individuals with the precious guarantees of
free expression under the first amendment.
III. RECONCILING THE PRIVACY TORT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT
No attempt will be made here to present an exhaustive review of
all the proposals advanced to resolve the conflict between the privacy tort
and the first amendment. Each could be an article in its own right. I will
sketch out, however, three distinctly different remedies which may be loosely
characterized as: (1) the strict liability model patterned after the British
scheme; (2) the first amendment privilege model advocated by the news
media; and (3) the accommodative model which, in theory, seeks to accord
equal weight to both interests.
A. The British Model of Strict Liability
Although much of the British common law, including seditious libel,
crossed the Atlantic and became incorporated into American common
law, we are reminded that "one of the objects of the Revolution was to
get rid of the English common law on liberty of speech and of the
press .. ."I2 A comparative perspective must take into account two sig-
nificant differences between the nations. First, unlike the United States, the
British do not have a first amendment which explicitly guarantees con-
stitutional protection to speech and press against governmental infringement.
Secondly, the British have repeatedly rejected a statutory right of privacy,
although certain privacy interests are protected under a variety of common
law torts relating to property rights. Succinctly stated, the British have tended
to follow Prosser more than Warren and Brandeis.
A perusal of British literature supports the view that broadcasting media
100 Comment, First Amendment Limitations on Public Disclosure Actions, 45 U. CHI. L. REv.
180, 190 (1977).
101 The author identified the five standards as: (1) Public Interest, (2) Defendant's Motives,
(3) Consent, (4) Offensiveness, and (5) the California approach which is unique. Id. at
191-202.
102 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263-64 (1941).
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and especially the press are less free there than in the United States."'0
Several commentators' have stated flatly that under British law, it would
have been impossible for the press to duplicate the role played by The
Washington Post in the Watergate scandal. The restraints on the British
press, in addition to libel, include subjection to the laws of trespass, slander,
breach of confidence, copyright and also prosecution for contempt of court
for any violations of Parliamentary privilege or the Official Secrets Act. 5
However, these restraints have not inhibited certain British publications
from engaging in sensationalism and irresponsible journalism in bringing
to the public's attention the kinds of private matters that raise first amend-
ment/privacy questions in the United States.' When an Englishman takes
offense at the news media for unwanted publicity or the disclosure of private
information, he often rests his legal case on proprietary grounds; English
courts take a dim view of those who would violate the old adage that "an
Englishman's home is his castle."''
During the past two decades, three unsuccessful attempts have been
made to enact a general bill on the right to privacy. In 1961 the bill had
been introduced into the House of Lords while the bills in 1967 and 1969
originated in the House of Commons.' There also have been a series
of governmental commissions since World War II in response to a general
concern over the privacy issue and a lack of media self-restraint. The
publication of a report by British Jurists"'° favoring privacy legislation
along with the introduction of still another privacy bill, spurred the govern-
103 See, e.g., THE GRANADA GUILDHALL LECTURES, THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (1974); A.
THOMPSON, BIG BROTHER IN BRITAIN TODAY (1974); C. SEYMOUR-URE, THE PRESS, PoLmTcs
AND THE PUBLIC (1968); and M. JONES, PRIVACY (1974).
104 Evans, The Half-Free Press in THE FREEDOM OF THm PRESS, supra note 103, at 23;
Street, Could English Law Cope?, 124 NEw L.J. 796 (1974); D. MADGWCcK and T. SMYrHE,
THE INVASION OF PRIVACY, at 149 (1974).
105 Evans, supra note 104, at 43. Generally speaking, only libel, slander, trespass (intrusion),
copyright, and breach of confidence (off-the-record conversations) involve the public dis-
closure of private information. Parliamentary privilege is similar to our congressional im-
munity and the Official Secrets Act is directed at civil servants who pass on to a third party,
government information without official sanction. The British news media could become
involved under the Act if it asks for or receives such information. See A. THOMPSON, supra
note 103, at 32-33.
106 For illustrations ranging from the publication of photographs of a demented girl running
nude in the street to a dead girl hanging from a wrecked airplane, see Pedrick, Publicity and
Privacy: Is It Any of Our Business?, 20 U. TORONTO LJ. 391, 393 (1970).
107 See, e.g., T. LEA, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS, at 1-5 (1947), which concerns the famous
Daily Mirror case of the 1940's and A. THOMPSON, supra note 104, at 132-33, where the
judge awarded damages of 1,000 Z against a photographer who had taken pictures at the
wedding of a bride whose father had been murdered recently. The photographer proceeded
to sell the pictures to the press.
10 M. Jor'ms, supra note 103, at 11.
'
0
9 PRIVACY AND THE LAW, BRITISH SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS,
at 3 (1970); where it was concluded that a new statutory tort of "infringement of privacy"
was necessary in England.
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ment to establish yet another commission under the Rt. Hon. Kenneth
Younger. 110 The Younger Committee spent two years studying the issue,
collecting data, polling citizens, but it arrived at the same conclusion as
in the past; i.e., the British did not need a law recognizing a general right
to privacy. 1 '
Only a few of the Committee's findings can be stated here. The Younger
Committee conducted a survey of public attitudes towards privacy as part
of its larger study."' The pertinent survey results indicated that (a) the
survey respondents do not consider privacy as important an issue as in-
flation, unemployment, strikes, etc.;"' (b) when compared with social
issues such as race relations, freedom of speech and press, and equal rights
for women, protecting privacy was of the first concern;", (c) only one
per cent of the respondents indicated that their privacy had been violated
by the press,"' while an even smaller number thought it had been violated
by the broadcast media."1
The Committee tried its hand at defining privacy but reached the
conclusion that it was virtually impossible to reach a consensus as to a
general "right to be let alone" which could serve as a workable basis for
legal protection."' Therefore, rather than affirm the conclusion of the
British Jurist report or lend support to the pending privacy bill, the Younger
Committee recommended a series of specific proposals aimed at strengthen-
ing the existing oversight committees, the Press Council and the Pro-
grammes Complaints Commission which deals with broadcasting."' While
it may be an oversimplification of the study's findings, it does appear that
the members of the Younger Committee found that Great Britain, utilizing
existing statutes and recognized common law torts, was protecting privacy
interests as effectively as the Continent and the United States where a
right of privacy was legally recognized." 9
110 YOUNGER COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE CoI4MrITEE ON PRIVACY (1972).
11, Id. at 9.
2 For the results of the complete survey report, see id., App. E at 228-272.
2l Id., App. E at 230-31.
"A Id.
115 YOUNGER CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 110, at 37.
116 ld. at 57.
117 Id. at 10.
I'slId. at 13-14. Although it is not our concern in this article, the reader should know that
the Younger Committee studied a wide variety of subjects related to privacy and made
recommendations in its report regarding banks and credit agencies, computers and technical
surveillance, employment records, and questionnaires, student records and teacher personnel
files, medical records, and the licensing of private detectives. Id. at ch. 3.
"19 Id. at 25-30; the Committee compared the British situation to the status of privacy in
France, Germany, and the United States.
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Has this brief and superficial foray into British law reaped an empty
harvest for our purposes? Not entirely, because buried within the heart of
the Younger Committee's report lies the seed of an idea that could possibly
aid us in resolving our dilemma. In discussing the press and the broadcast
media and their primary function to inform the public, the Committee
drew a fine distinction between news which is "of public interest," i.e., de-
signed to entertain or satisfy curiosity, and news which is "in the public
interest," i.e., designed to enhance knowledge, oversee government, and
report on matters of educational and moral interest to the community.'"
This model will be discussed more fully herein.
B. The First Amendment Privilege Model
During the period when Justices Douglas and Black were on the
Supreme Court, they shared the view that the first amendment freedoms
held a "preferred position" in the constitutional scheme."' Without this
preferred position, the rest of the Bill of Rights is ineffective and without
meaning. Although the "preferred position" doctrine never gained majority
support on the Court, it remains appealing to journalists and broadcasters
who think of all the extra "breathing space"'' 2 they would enjoy by its
adoption.
To convince the public and judges of the importance of the speech
and press privilege, the news media support their position by quoting figures
such as Thomas Jefferson and David Brinkley. How can one respond to
Jefferson's remark that, "When the press is free and every man able to read,
all is safe,"' 2 or to Brinkley's rhetorical question: "[I]s our democracy
going to be overthrown someday by CBS, or is it more likely to be over-
thrown by somebody in the White House?"'24 Jack Nelson, Washington
bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times, has gone on public record as ad-
120 Id. at 47.
121 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, explicitly stated:
"Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position." 319
U.S. 105, 115 (1942). In a more recent case, he wrote: 'The press has a preferred position
in our constitutional scheme.... to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know. The
right to know is crucial to the governing powers of the people." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Black read the first amendment in
absolute terms, but in his dissent in Dennis v. United States, he hoped that some "later
Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they
belong in a free society." 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951). The origin of the preferred position
doctrine dates back to Chief Justice Stone's famous footnote in United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
122 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1962); the Court first referred to the term in
relation to awarding to associations the "breathing space" that is required for first amendment
freedom to survive.
123 Quoted in Bingham, Responsibilities of a Free Press, in THE ESSENTIALS OF FREEDOM,
at 106-07 (1960).
124 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE ROUNDTABLE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, at 72 (1972).
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vocating an almost absolute privilege to the press under the first amend-
ment. " ' Another journalist scholar, in the preface to a book on the press
and the developing right of privacy, posed this question to the reader:
"Which is more important, the protection given to society by a free and
unfettered press, or the peace of mind given to the individual by rigid pro-
tection of the right to privacy."126 Should one still remain skeptical after all
the rhetoric, we are assured that journalism is a more responsible profession
today than it was in 1890, as witnessed by the growth of professional
graduate schools, professional organizations, and the creation of a code
of ethics.12
I have no doubt that the strongly held beliefs of the press emanate
from the highest intentions, but adoption of the first amendment privilege
doctrine is so sweeping in scope as to virtually overwhelm the most legitimate
counterclaim of privacy interests. Journalists, like other professionals, com-
pose an interest group anxious to retain as many special privileges as
possible. The slightest restriction placed upon their freedom is viewed as
a threat; the growing concern over privacy in general and public disclosure
in particular, is perceived as an infringement. Moreover, the news media
tends to view the privacy/public disclosure issue in terms of either/or,
as if the values involved were diametrically in opposition to each other.
The question is framed in such a way as to polarize the issue, placing the
value to society of a vigorous and free press to expose the Watergates and
the "Koreagates," in opposition to a vaguely defined interest of the in-
dividual to retain sole control of private facts because the disclosure of this
knowledge, which may be true, might prove embarrassing.
Framed in such a manner, it is a convincing argument. Presently, it
is both difficult and unpopular to disagree with the media, which is basking
in the glory of the Watergate aftermath. However, a majority of the press
initially accepted, without challenge, the White House version of the break-
in. Also, the scandal was exposed mainly due to the efforts of two reporters
supported by a courageous editor and publisher. As the former president
of the New York Bar Association aptly stated: "By and large, it is only the
rare journalist who really believes in the public's right to know. The rest
125 Id. at 18.
6 D. PEMBER, supra note 3, at xi. (emphasis added). Later in the preface, Pember de-
scribes the objective of his study as being "to help those members of society not directly in-
volved with law to understand better the limitations and restrictions placed upon mass media
by the law of privacy." Id. at vii.
L27 Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Implications on Re-
porting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REv. 107, 146 (1963).
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are usually content to sit back and read the wire-service tickers or the
handouts from public information officers.""1 '
Neither freedom of expression nor privacy are philosophic abstractions
or absolute rights. In their respective spheres, they represent values which
are essential to a free people in a free society. An operational principle is
needed to discover the proper weighing of these legitimate, competing
claims so that neither interest is unreasonably diminished.
C. The Accommodative Model
In an attempt to avoid the strict liability approach on one hand, and the
virtually unfettered news privilege position on the other hand, two remedies
have been advanced to balance the privacy tort when it comes in conflict
with the first amendment privilege: (1) injunctive relief, and (2) right
to reply. A third remedy, a balancing of the public benefit with the social
utility is proposed.
(1) Injunctive Relief
It may be recalled that Warren and Brandeis suggested that injunctive
relief, used sparingly, might be a proper remedy for particular kinds of
privacy invasions." 9 More than eighty years later, a legal commentator
recommended that the Warren and Brandeis suggestion be applied to situ-
ations where substantial harm or injury is likely to occur and where there
is no public issue involved. 3' The author was of the opinion that an injunc-
tion, narrowly drawn, may be a proper and just remedy to prevent either
"false-light" publications or media publicity of embarrassing personal facts
about the individual. 1 '
Two problems can be forseen with the utilization of injunctive relief
in an invasion of privacy case. The more serious reservation is the lurking
spectre of judicial censorship over the news media. Although overzealous
judges exercising prior restraint over local newspapers and broadcasting
stations would likely run afoul of the Constitution and be corrected on
appeal, the mere threat of the injunction with its subsequently long and
costly litigation would be enough to produce the "chilling effect" that the
128 W. Seymour, Jr., The Public's Right to Know-Who Decides What the Public Should
Be Told?, 29 REc. OF N.Y. CrrY B.A. 625, 627-28 (1974) (emphasis in original).
129 Warren and Brandeis, supra note 3, at 219. Unfortunately, the authors failed to elaborate
on the "limited class of cases" they had in mind.
l30 Comment, Right of Privacy-Availability of Injunctive Relief for Invasion of Privacy,
39 Mo. L. REV. 647 (1974).
'B2 Id. at 658.
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first amendment was intended to prevent.13 The Onassis case is a graphic
illustration of the second problem. When a lower court issued the injunctive
relief Mrs. Onassis prayed for, it was substantially modified by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals.13 I suspect that appellate court judges, in par-
ticular, are very reluctant to impose an infringement on the press or the
broadcasting media that would lay them open to an appeal on constitutional
grounds. In my judgment, Warren and Brandeis were correct in their pre-
diction that privacy could be protected by utilization of the injunction
only in a few, exceptional cases.
(2) Right to Reply
Another attempt to avoid the all-or-nothing tort damages remedy is
the suggestion, proposed in regard to defamation rather than privacy, that
the injured party be granted the right to reply to the accusations and that
the publisher or broadcaster be given the opportunity to publicly retract.1"'
It is proposed here as an alternative to litigation in privacy cases. It should
be remembered that Justice Brennan's opinion, in the now repudiated
Rosenbloom case, seemed to invite such a remedy: "If the States fear that
private citizens will not be able to respond adequately to publicity involving
them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring their ability to respond,
rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public concern." ' 5
Justice Brennan was inviting the states to open up the marketplace of
discussion by enacting right to reply laws. Ironically, the state of Florida
had a law which required newspapers to give equal space to a political
candidate whom the paper had attacked. Tornillo, a candidate for public
office, was subjected in an article in the Miami Herald to hostile criticism
and requested an opportunity to reply to the charges. A unanimous Court
rejected the right to reply doctrine as it applied to the press on the rationale
that editors and publishers cannot be compelled under the first amendment
to publish that which "'reason' tells them should not be published.1 23 6
Although the Court admitted that press responsibility was laudatory and a
1
32 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965), where the phrase was used by
the Court in a different context. When applied to the first amendment, however, the phrase
refers to protecting the freedoms guaranteed by the amendment from the threat of sanctions
in addition to the actual imposition of sanctions. Reportedly, the cost of defending a libel
action begins at $20,000 and could reach $100,000. See L. TRmIE, supra note 29, at 642
n.25.
1
33 Supra note 98 and accompanying text.
'34 Fleming, Retraction and Reply: Alternative Remedies for Defamation, 12 U. BRrr. COL.
L. REV. 15, 31 (1978).
135 403 U.S. at 47.
136 Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 214, 256 (1976). The law the Court
invalidated had been enacted in 1973. FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973).
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desirable goal, it neither was mandated by the Constitution nor could
it be achieved by legislation. 3"
Ignoring constitutional issues for the moment, the right to reply doc-
trine is an unlikely remedy for public disclosure situations, since the facts
that are made public may be true. The right to reply fails in privacy cases
because it rests on the presumption that a "good dose of truth" can overcome
the original publicity. While this presumption is perhaps without basis in
fact because the truth doesn't always catch up with the lie, a right to reply
at least affords the defamed individual an opportunity to reduce, if not
erase, any injury done to reputation. However, the harm done in privacy
cases involving disclosure of embarrassing, often true, facts about the in-
dividual lies in the mental anguish suffered. As one astute legal scholar put
it: "Once the cat is out of the bag, it cannot be put back.""'
(3) The Public Benefit/Social Utility Test
There is a third remedy which I lay before the reader with the ex-
pectation that if it has merit, it will be more fully explored by other scholars.
The privacy tort has suffered from its historical entanglement with defam-
ation. This entanglement should be severed by the courts once and for all.
The line of cases from New York Times to Firestone is indicative of the
problems faced by the Court in its unsuccessful attempt to establish clear
standards, cognizable to the lower courts, between the three major classi-
fications: public official, public figure, and the involuntary individual, such
as Oliver Sipple, who is thrust into the midst of public controversy or who
becomes "newsworthy" due to events over which the individual has no con-
trol. It is submitted that in invasion of privacy cases, these distinctions
should be abolished.
It is here where we may profit from the work of the Younger Com-
mittee. That body made a significant distinction, which our courts generally
have failed to make in privacy cases, between activities, events, and news
that are "of public interest" and matters that properly lie "in the public
interest."1 9 The media should report information of a personal or private
nature only it if demonstrably serves a bonafide public benefit or is of
social utility to the community. Legislatures should establish specific stand-
ards to assist the news media in determining which kinds of private infor-
mation warrant public disclosure under the public benefit/social utility
test. Under the Younger Committee's standard, for example, it may be
legitimate in some instances for the news media to identify the victim of
237 Id. at 256.
188 L. TamE, supra note 29, at 651.
139 YOUNGER COMMITTEE REPORtT, supra note 110, at 47.
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a rape. One such circumstance occurred in the Joan Little case, where the
sexual assault was related to the murder charge. However, even in a
case like Cohn, I do not believe it is necessary for the nation to know the
name of the rape victim, since such identification, although a matter of
public record, does not benefit the community but does cause pain and
anguish to the victim and/or the victim's family.
The Younger Committee standard would also allow public figures to
carry on a private life, albeit one more greatly restricted than that of the
private citizen. Public advocates like Ralph Nader and public figures like
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis have a legitimate right to be "let alone" if
privacy is to have any meaning in terms of the self. The public does not
have an absolute right to know, under the first amendment, all the private
activities of such individuals. However, should an elected or appointed
official be an alcoholic, disclosure of such personal information is warranted,
because it may bear directly on the exercise of his official functions. The
constituency of the elected official has a right to know this information, since
the public must be enabled to weigh its significance in fulfilling its governing
role. The appointed official may not be performing to his capability, or the
individual's misconduct and the action or inaction taken may reflect on the
administration in power. Although embarrassing to the individual to have
such information made known to the world, it is not only reasonable, but
desirable, for the media to make it known if the people are ultimately to be
the governors. A news event, such as a disaster or a crime, should without
question be covered by the media. However, the courts ought to impose a
time limit on follow-up stories to such events unless there is prior consent.
Families such as the Hills and Cantrells should not be newsworthy forever.
Finally, each state should create the equivalent of the British Press
Council and Programmes Complaint Commission to process complaints
from individuals who believe their privacy has been invaded by the news
media." '4 Of course, the alleged harm will have been done, but such an
administrative body can still make a worthy contribution to protecting
privacy interests. For example, suppose a determination is made that the
media was wrong in publishing or broadcasting the information. The ad-
ministrative body could be empowered to take the following steps: (1)
request that the adjudication report be made public, leaving it to the
people to decide on the credibility of the publication or broadcast station;
140 Id. at 44. The Younger Committee discovered in its study of the British Press Council
over a one year period that the Council processed 370 complaints relating to privacy in-
vasions. Of these, 267 either were withdrawn or not pursued by the complainant, 34 were
rejected after an initial screening and 31 more were disallowed by the full Council. Con-
sequently, 38 complaints were adjudicated with 13 being decided in favor of the complainant
and 25 being rejected as without merit..
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(2) admonish the media wrongdoer if an invasion occurred but was judged
to be not serious enough to warrant a public confession as in (1) above;
and (3) in the event there is litigation, the jury and the judge could take
into account the failure of the news media to print the adjudicating report,
and should the plaintiff be successful, punitive as well as actual damages
should be awarded.
Undoubtedly, the above proposals will be construed by the media as
harsh, if not unconstitutional. The first amendment, however, does not
require that the public has an absolute right to know everything. Unless
the media exercise greater restraint on public disclosure of private facts,
and unless the media come to accept the fact that privacy is also an impor-
tant value in a free society, the recourse may eventually be some form of
censorship. In attempting to balance these competing interests, a future
Court may decide that privacy is more important than certain kinds of
public disclosures currently protected by the first amendment privilege
and impose a narrowly defined form of prior restraint. To avoid this odious
prospect, it is respectfully submitted that the news media adopt as part of
their code of ethics the British distinction between news "of public interest"
and news that is "in the public interest." The former, by satisfying curiosity,
discredits the profession, while the latter provides the community with
the information it needs to have and yet pays homage to the dignity of the
human personality.
CONCLUSION
It is ironic that while recent legal history records the emergence of
a constitutional right to privacy, the Supreme Court, in a line of cases
from New York Times to Firestone, has restricted the common law tort of
privacy. The legal issues are particularly complex and admittedly difficult
to reconcile when the public disclosure tort comes in conflict with first
amendment privileges. Expansion of the privacy tort need not necessarily
impose an unreasonable burden on the news media, provided the Supreme
Court distinguishes between defamation and privacy invasion and establishes
and applies to the latter wrong its own legal principles.
The Court seems perfectly willing to accord legal protection to privacy
from governmental encroachment and interference. However, it has tended
to overlook the fact that in contemporary society the invaders of privacy
are not only agents of the state, but institutions of the private sector. We
are constantly being required to provide personal information about our-
selves to banks and credit agencies, employers, schools and colleges, hospitals,
etc. Additionally, we are faced by the increasing desire of the news media
to fill each page of every newspaper and each minute of every broadcast.
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This insatiable appetite for information, not to mention the rivalry between
print journalism and the broadcast media, has led the news media to seek
out and publish information about individuals that may do no more than
to satisfy our curiosity or appeal to our baser instincts, rather than to inform
and enlighten us. In the future, the news media could be one of our greatest
enemies, should they persist in diminishing our sense of self-worth by not
respecting our reasonable expectations for privacy.
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